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Abstract. The authors offer an analysis of the property reforms that accompanied economic 
transformation in late socialist and postsocialist Yugoslavia, as experienced and narrated by 
industrial workers in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia today. The property reforms carried out 
in these two countries between 1990 and the 2000s have profoundly influenced the narratives 
that workers form around their experience of economic transformation in the workplace. 
By analysing how industrial workers have developed a feeling of ownership towards their 
particular workplace, and how they now talk about that experience, the authors provide an 
explanation for workers’ disillusionment and dissatisfaction towards privatisation reforms in 
recent years, and show how they have made sense of the seismic shifts in property relations 
that have accompanied economic reforms since 1989.
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Introduction
This article provides new insights into the ways that workers in postsocialist 
industrial settings in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia, in the following) 
engaged with economic transformations during the late socialist era (1987-1990), 
the dissolution of Yugoslavia (1991-1999), and the postwar economic reconstruc-
tion since the late 1990s.1 Throughout three decades of change, as we argue, 
workers have internalised notions of social property and have translated this 
sense into a ‘feeling of ownership’ that transcends the watershed moment of 
1  For a concise discussion on the relevance of emotions in the post-Yugoslav workplace cf. 
Chiara Bonfiglioli, Structures of Feeling after Yugoslavia, IWMpost. Magazine of the Institut für 
die Wissenschaften vom Menschen / Institute for Human Sciences 119 (2017), 20-21, https://issuu.
com/institute_for_human_sciences/docs/iwmpost_119. All internet sources were accessed 
on 19 November 2017. 
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the Yugoslav dissolution. This understanding of ownership, informed by mul-
tiple sets of privatisation reforms and the particular experience of postsocialist 
transformation, has shaped workers’ narratives. Here, the case of post-Yugoslav 
countries is particularly salient: workers accustomed to a self-managed setting 
preferred the workers’-shareholding privatisation initiated by the last socialist 
government but rejected privatisations implemented more recently (in the early 
2000s). As we conclude, this is because the economic reforms of the 1990s had 
been embedded in the tradition of self-management, internalised by workers 
and influencing their responses to different waves of privatisation. 
Scholars working on the post-Yugoslav context have recently directed their 
attention to the condition of the (post)socialist working class and to privatisa-
tion’s effects on workplace relations. Sociologists, anthropologists, and histo-
rians have investigated workplaces and companies under late socialism and 
postsocialism—with a particular focus on Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia.2 From 
either a perspective of industrial relations or of culture and memory studies, 
the influence of Yugoslav self-management in the past has been acknowledged 
to have affected the contemporary postsocialist workplace.3 Yet there has been 
comparatively little research on the narratives that workers produce to make 
sense of developments in property relations within the industrial workplace. 
Recently, the literature on ‘Yugonostalgia’ has brought memory and experi-
ences into the picture of (post-)Yugoslav labour and cultural studies.4 These 
2  Marko Grdešić, Mapping the Paths of the Yugoslav Model. Labour Strength and Weakness 
in Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia, European Journal of Industrial Relations 14, no. 2 (2008), 13-51, 
DOI: 10.1177/0959680108089187; Mihajl Arandarenko, Waiting for the Workers. Explaining 
Labor Quiescence in Serbia, in: David Ost / Stephen Crowley, eds, Workers After Workers’ 
States. Explaining Labor Quiescence in Post-Communist Europe, Lanham et al. 2001, 159-180; 
Jake Lowinger, Economic Reform and the ‘Double Movement’ in Yugoslavia. And Analysis of 
Labor Unrest and Ethno-Nationalism in the 1980s, PhD Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 
Baltimore/MD 2009; Ivan Rajković, Struggles for Moral Ground. Problems with Work and 
Legitimacy in a Serbian Industrial Town, PhD Dissertation, University of Manchester 2015; 
Ildiko Erdei, Čekajući Ikeu. Potrošačka kultura u postsocijalizmu i pre njega, Belgrade 2012.
3  Tanja Petrović, Yuropa. Jugoslawisches Erbe und Zukunftsperspektiven in postjugoslawi-
schen Gesellschaften, Berlin 2015; Andrea Milat, Der Aufstand der Kamensko-Arbeiterinnen. 
Wie dem Kapitalismus Widerstand zu leisten ist, in: Michael G. Kraft, ed, Soziale Kämpfe in 
Ex-Jugoslawien, Vienna 2013, 183-209; Nina Vodopivec, Textile Workers in Slovenia. From 
Nimble Fingers to Tired Bodies, Anthropology of East Europe Review 28, no. 1 (2010), 165-183; 
Predrag Marković, Wahrheit und Erinnerung an die Arbeit im sozialistischen Jugoslawien. 
Zwischen Kritik und Märchen vom Schlaraffenland?, in: Klaus Roth, ed, Arbeit im Sozia-
lismus – Arbeit im Postsozialismus. Erkundungen zum Arbeitsleben im östlichen Europa, 
Münster 2004, 259-272; Marko Grdešić, Exceptionalism and Its Limits. The Legacy of Self-Man-
agement in the Former Yugoslavia, in: Stephen Crowley / Teri Caraway / Maria Cook, eds, 
Working Through the Past. Labor and Authoritarian Legacies in Comparative Perspective, 
Ithaca/NY 2015, 103-21, 18.
4  Tanja Petrović, ‘When We Were Europe.’ Socialist Workers in Serbia and Their Nostalgic 
Narratives, in: Maria Todorova, ed, Remembering Communism. Genres of Representation, 
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studies tend to juxtapose workers’ attachment to the self-managerial norm of 
their socialist past with a grim postsocialist present. However, this very contrast 
tends to reify the (socialist) past and the (postsocialist) present, crystallising each 
into a static moment of ‘then’ and ‘now’, respectively. We argue that an array of 
property transformations, which encompasses more than the teleological vision 
of a ‘transition’ from a socialist to a capitalist economy, has affected workers’ 
self-positioning vis-à-vis property relations in the workplace.5 
We suggest that privatisation in the (post-)Yugoslav contexts can be better 
understood in relation to its social and cultural consequences. Adopting an an-
thropological approach to property relations, we thus understand privatisation 
to be not ‘just’ a transfer of capital from the state to private hands, but rather 
the transformation of ‘political, economic, cultural, and social constructs and 
relationships through which persons are related to one another by things or 
values’.6 Specifically, we seek to broaden the concept of property to encompass 
social relationships and practices, and view property transformations in late so-
cialist and postsocialist Yugoslavia as a ‘major factor in constituting the identity 
of individuals and groups’.7 What we argue is that workers make sense of their 
past and present experiences through already familiar ideas of ownership and 
workplace relations that stem from the socialist and postsocialist experience.
In this context, we analyse ‘working life stories’, focusing on biographical 
aspects and personal reflections that range over the course of a person’s work-
ing life.8 We draw on interviews as sources that enable a cultural and historical 
analysis of privatisation, adding the individual perspectives that have been 
overlooked in the established literature.9 We can thus understand privatisation 
as a process in the making, from which emerge workers’ narratives of dispos-
session and resistance, as well as their present construction of a ‘feeling of 
New York 2010, 127-154; Mitja Velikonja, Lost in Transition. Nostalgia for Socialism in 
Post-Socialist Countries, East European Politics and Societies 23, no. 4 (2009), 535-51, DOI: 
10.1177/0888325409345140; Chiara Bonfiglioli, Gendering Social Citizenship. Textile Workers 
in Post-Yugoslav States, The Europeanisation of Citizenship in the Successor States of the 
Former Yugoslavia (CITSEE) Working Paper Series 30, Edinburgh 2013, http://www.citsee.
ed.ac.uk/working_papers/files/CITSEE_WORKING_PAPER_2013-30a.pdf.
5  Valerie Bunce, Lessons of the First Postsocialist Decade, East European Politics and Societies 
13, no. 2 (1999), 236-243.
6  Katherine Verdery, Property and Politics in and after Socialism, Revista Română de Sociologie 
19 (ser. 9), no. 1-2 (2008), 37-55, 40.
7  Alongside what was theorised in Keebet von Benda-Beckmann / Franz von Benda-Beck-
mann / Melanie W. Wiber, The Properties of Property, in: Keebet von Benda-Beckmann / Franz 
von Benda-Beckmann / Melanie W. Wiber, eds, Changing Properties of Property, New 
York / Oxford 2006, 1-39, 2.
8  Karolina J. Dudek, Working Life Stories, in: Ivor Goodson et al., eds, The Routledge In-
ternational Handbook on Narrative and Life History, New York, London 2016, 225-236, 226.
  9  Ivor Goodson, Introduction. Life Histories and Narratives, in: Goodson et al., eds, The 
Routledge International Handbook on Narrative and Life History, 3-10, 5. 
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ownership’. Different historical experiences—reform socialism, the sweeping 
changes of the early 1990s, war (1992-1999) and sanctions, and capitalist trans-
formations—as well as the current situation have all contributed to the ways that 
workers have constructed a ‘feeling of ownership’ towards their workplaces. 
To illustrate our argument, we focus on two case studies, Energoinvest in Bosnia 
and Jugoremedija in Serbia. 
Founded in Sarajevo in the 1950s, Energoinvest had become the fourth biggest 
producer in Yugoslavia by the early 1980s. In 1987, it employed between 50,000 
and 55,000 workers.10 The company’s headquarters in Sarajevo counted on 
heavy industrial production based in Bosnia (mines and factories) and a pool of 
joint ventures across the globe. The pharmaceutical factory Jugoremedija, a joint 
venture with the German company Hoechst AG, was part of the agro-industrial 
combine Servo Mihalj in Zrenjanin, Serbia. This medium-sized factory employed 
500 workers at its peak in 1989. In the city of Zrenjanin, Jugoremedija’s work-
ers were amongst the highest paid.11 Even though the two companies were 
different in terms of size and industrial sector, their development and relative 
success in the national and international markets during the socialist period 
were analogous. 
Firstly, we illustrate the principles of social ownership in the Yugoslav sys-
tem of self-management and look closely at the experiences of work in socialist 
factories. Secondly, we discuss the first privatisation reforms undertaken from 
1988 to 1991 in Bosnia and from 1988 to 2001 in Serbia, and follow workers’ 
narratives formed around this initial privatisation. Finally, we reflect upon the 
post-2000 privatisation as an additional moment of change that has deeply 
affected what we delineate as a ‘feeling of ownership’. Workers refer to these 
major changes in the 1990s and early 2000s as defining moments for their notion 
of ownership and their relationship to their own workplaces. Although their 
testimonies are informed by the current situation, these developments are the 
major events they refer to as having shaped their narratives, and thus we focus 
on them in our analysis.
A Word on Methodology
In this study, we have relied on oral history interviews as our main sources, 
which we have combined with archival materials such as factory newspapers and 
enterprise documents. The focus on these sources has allowed us to investigate 
workers’ perspectives on change and has revealed how workers construct their 
10  10 najvećih proizvodnih organizacija udruženog rada u oblasti industrija i rudarstva, 
poljoprivrede i šumarstva i građevinarstva, Ekonomska Politika, 7 September 1987, 5.
11  Lek za svet, Kombinat, 8 September 1989, 3. 
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sense of past experiences vis-à-vis their assessment of their current situation.12 
We view our material as a repository of both history and memory. In each fac-
tory, we have collected roughly thirty semi-structured interviews, mostly with 
white- and blue-collar workers but also with current and former managers. Most 
of the interviewees were between 40 and 70 years old, and thus experienced first-
hand within the same workplace late socialist self-management, the collapse of 
Yugoslavia, and the privatisation reforms in its wake. Some of these respondents 
were members of workers’ councils or unions at some point in their working 
lives; very few had been members of the Communist Party. Some were veter-
ans of the conflict in Bosnia (1992-1995) and Croatia (1991-1995). Most of them 
struggled as a consequence of privatisation reforms; most are now unemployed 
and endure a low standard of living. All these factors inform their narratives.13
Self-Management and Social Ownership  
in Late Socialist Yugoslavia
The predominant form of property relation in socialist Yugoslavia was neither 
state-owned nor private, but social. Self-management was introduced in factories 
after 1950. After the conflict with the Soviet Union in 1948, the principle was 
re-modelled and re-enforced to distance the Yugoslav practice from the Soviet 
model of a state-planned economy and state ownership. With self-management 
as the principal form of organisation within society, workers were elected as the 
central actors for decision-making on the shop floor. Self-management’s main 
architect, Edvard Kardelj, clarified that factories should be organised according 
to egalitarian relations, where ‘no one can, on the basis of [social] ownership 
[…] acquire a superior position in relation to other workers’.14 Workers were 
thus nominally in charge of the distribution and administration of resources 
in the factories. 
Furthermore, social ownership was defined not as a system of relationships 
between people and things, but as relationships between people.15 As such, 
companies across Yugoslavia were not formally owned by anyone but by soci-
ety at large; self-management would ensure the ‘right of every citizen to freely 
12  Harald Welzer, Das Interview als Artefakt. Zur Kritik der Zeitzeugenforschung, in: 
Julia Obertreis, ed, Oral History. Basistexte. Stuttgart 2012, 247-260; Indira Chowdhury, Oral 
Traditions and Contemporary History-Event, Memory, Experience and Representation, 
Economic&Political Weekly 49, no. 30 (2014), 54-59.
13  In the following, we use only the first names of our interviewees, which sometimes, 
upon request, were changed to ensure anonymity.
14  Edvard Kardelj, Samoupravljanje i Društvena Svojina, Sarajevo 1982, 223.
15  Edvard Kardelj / Miroljub Labus, Društvena ili Grupna Svojina, Belgrade 1987, 26.
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dispose of the fruits of their own labour’.16 From 1963, when self-management 
was officially included in the constitution, social ownership was based on the 
idea that ownership would be nobody’s and everybody’s, with management 
given over to workers’ and citizens’ collectives.
Although according to self-management theory there would be equality in 
decision-making between workers and managers, employees often criticised 
workers’ councils for their lack of effectiveness and representativeness. Socio-
logical studies had already revealed in the 1960s that the workforce’s elected 
representatives in the workers’ councils, envisioned as the most powerful 
entity of self-management, had essentially less influence on decision-making 
than managers.17 The liberal reforms of the 1960s opened up a wider gap be-
tween management and workers with regard to decision-making and to wage 
differences. The reforms leading towards the Act of Associated Labour (Zakon 
o udruženom radu) in 1976, aimed at empowering mechanisms of workers’ 
management, could not reverse these tendencies. The influence of workers’ 
councils and workers’ decision-making experienced even further decline during 
the 1980s. As Mrkšić has emphasised, managers used their political power to 
influence decisions in the factory.18 In the workers’ councils, workers, mostly 
preoccupied with questions of the distribution of housing and wages, found it 
increasingly difficult to fully put their management and ownership rights into 
practice.19 During council meetings active participation was largely confined 
to the representatives of management and (external) experts, especially when 
it came time to consider technical development or investments. 
Workers’ Narratives of Self-Management and Social Ownership
Workers’ recollections of the experience of self-management within En-
ergoinvest and Jugoremedija reveal their ambivalence towards socialist self-
management. In particular, these workers did not soft-pedal their views of the 
functioning of the workers’ councils and the extent to which there had actually 
been genuinely democratic decision-making. For example, while the elected 
members of the workers’ councils referred positively to self-management in 
16  Edvard Kardelj, Self-Management and the Political System. Socialist Thought and 
Practice, Belgrade 1980, 131.
17  Rudi Supek, Probleme und Erfahrungen der Jugoslawischen Arbeiterselbstverwaltung, 
in: Klaus-Detlev Grothusen / Othmar Nikola Haberl / Wolfgang Höpken, eds, Jugoslawien am 
Ende der Ära Tito, München 1985, 159-185, 171; Josip Županov, Samoupravljanje i društvena 
moć, Zagreb 1985, 132.
18  Danilo Mrkšić, Predstave o političkoj stratifikaciji u samoupravnom predužeću, in: 
Mihailo Popović et al., eds, Srbija krajem osamdesetih. Sociološko istraživanje društvenih 
nejednakosti i neusklađenosti, Belgrade 1991, 409-465, 421.
19  Harold Lydall, Yugoslavia in Crisis. Business and Economics, Oxford 1989, 76.
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their factories, other workers were mostly disappointed.20 As Darko, a blue-
collar worker from Jugoremedija, reflected:
‘The social property and the idea that workers would be managing their factories, 
an idea upon which our former political leaders had sworn, that was a total lie. The 
authority in all companies during socialism had the general manager, the public 
and political servants, and at the bottom single bosses or workers organised in the 
trade union. But the trade union stood behind the general manager.’21
Workers from Energoinvest factories across Bosnia were similarly critical of self-
management. They admitted that their decision-making power was limited in 
terms of both the nature and hierarchy of decisions. Šaban, a factory worker in 
an Energoinvest foundry in Tuzla, commented:
‘That system too had its defects. We would discuss for three hours in the workers’ 
council, then we would receive a call from the top and we would be told what 
decision to take. It would come from the [party] committee. The decision would 
be taken already, and that would be it.’22
For the workers interviewed, the overbearing presence of the League of Com-
munists in Yugoslavia hindered the functioning of workers’ self-management. 
However, as the following testimony highlights, this view was accompanied 
by positive remarks about workers’ relations with their managers, in spite of 
their party’s influence. Mladen, an engineer in Energoinvest IRIS (an engineer-
ing and IT company) in Sarajevo, was a representative on his workers’ council. 
He recalled: 
‘We dealt with salaries, with workers’ rights, business trips or all sorts, not with 
new investments. It worked fairly well, and that was on our local level. There was 
a certain hierarchy and everything was decided in advance by the central board of 
directors, and by our first director Marko, and, well, it was certain that if Marko 
decided something it would be that way. But of course, he never did anything 
wrong … ok, he was a member of that Communist Party, very devoted I must say, 
but well we didn’t feel it … and we enjoyed it.’23
This last comment shows the varying dimensions of social relations in the fac-
tory. In this case, Mladen feels comfortable criticising workers’ self-management 
as ineffectual, and even ironically remarks on the power of his director. How-
ever, he adjusts his criticism by noting how this did not particularly affect his 
experience in the workplace, which was more strongly shaped by a sense of 
20  Supek, Probleme und Erfahrungen der jugoslawischen Arbeiterselbstverwaltung, 180. 
21  Darko, interview with Jurkat, Jugoremedija, Zrenjanin, 4 February 2014. Cf. Kathrin Jurkat, 
Erosion of Self-Management. A Yugoslav Factory in Post-Socialist Transition, SEER. Journal 
for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe 20, no. 1, (2017), 101-116, 105, DOI: 10.5771/1435-
2869-2017-1-101. 
22  Šaban, interview with Calori, Energoinvest, Tuzla, 29 April 2016.
23  Mladen, interview with Calori, Energoinvest IRIS, Sarajevo, 17 July 2014.
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trust towards the management. Trust and mutual respect, recurrent themes 
amongst our interviewees, shaped their views of workplace relations.24 These 
themes’ prevalence was partly due to the economic prosperity enjoyed by both 
companies, which meant that work stoppages and strikes—common in Yugo-
slavia—were infrequent even during the economic crisis of the late 1980s and 
the beginning of the 1990s. Employees attributed the success of their company 
to the management’s expertise. Ana, a blue-collar worker at Jugoremedija, said: 
‘This group of people that were our managers … Financially they had a bit of 
knowledge of what pharmaceuticals [the pharmaceutical industry and the branch] 
meant. For you, as a worker, it was not important. Everything worked and you had 
the feeling that your whole life would be like that.’25
When reflecting on their experience of the socialist past, workers rarely ideal-
ised the workplace as an idyllic space where they exerted full control; rather, 
they referred to the strictness of rules and the working ethos during the time of 
self-management. For example, for the pharmaceutical company Jugoremedija, 
hygienic standards were one of the most important sets of rules enforced by the 
management. Talking about the general manager, Ivana, a blue-collar worker, 
commented: 
‘He never sat in his office, he was just walking around. The whole day. With a white 
rag, he went over the windowsill and called the cleaning lady to ask why there is 
dust. Everything had to be in line. But he cherished work and workers.’26
Ivana here, like Mladen above, points to the workers’ ambivalent relationship 
towards management. On the one hand, they admired the general manager’s 
commitment to the factory and trusted his decision-making.27 On the other 
hand, workers viewed the general manager’s display of power on the shop 
floor as a strategy to enforce discipline. In this context, it was the interplay of 
authority, closeness, and trust that created a certain kind of affection towards 
the workplace. Interviewed workers generally see hierarchies not in a negative 
light but as a helpful means to ensure success in their company. Contesting the 
boundaries of the formal and informal order inside the factory while accepting 
or tolerating the managers’ authority allowed one to make a social space ‘one’s 
own’ through an active involvement in shaping it.28
24  Tatjana Thelen, The Loss of Trust. Changing Social Relations in the Workplace in Eastern 
Germany, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Working Paper 78, Halle 2005, http://
www.eth.mpg.de/pubs/wps/pdf/mpi-eth-working-paper-0078. 
25  Ana, interview with Jurkat, Jugoremedija, Zrenjanin, 26 February 2014.
26  Ivana, interview with Jurkat, Jugoremedija, Zrenjanin, 11 November 2015.
27  Here we use the male pronoun for general managers as in both cases these were posi-
tions covered by men.
28  Ulrike Schult, Zwischen Stechuhr und Selbstverwaltung. Eine Mikrogeschichte sozialer 
Konflikte in der jugoslawischen Fahrzeugindustrie 1965-1985, Berlin, Münster 2017, 144.
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When reflecting upon the self-managed workplace, the workers show an 
awareness of the socialist system’s many contradictions.29 They acknowledge 
that the self-managed workplace was also characterised by internal conflicts, 
though these were often downplayed by the workers themselves. For example, 
Jovana, a blue-collar worker at Jugoremedija, stated: ‘On the shop floor there were 
different kinds of people. I think it was not a terrible fight, some want this, and 
some want that. I was like at home. […] And after a while you are laughing. 
We were a family.’30
For Jovana, these social interactions, not exclusively positive, made her com-
pare the everyday life of the factory with that of a family. The vast majority of 
interviewed Energoinvest workers reported feelings of affection towards, and 
a deep familial connection with, their workplace and their colleagues.31 Edis, 
a factory worker in the transmission-lines factory Energoinvest TDS in Sarajevo, 
commented: ‘We all felt like it was our second home. We all felt like that, because 
we lived off that and we took care of it.’32 
Here, taking care of one’s workplace was not just a matter of dedication to-
wards the premises where one worked; it was also an investment in its develop-
ment. In fact, throughout the self-management years, part of the annual revenue 
was re-invested in the company’s growth. As such, workers were aware that part 
of what would otherwise have been paid to them in salary was contributing to 
the company’s advancement. Crucially, this increased their sense of attachment 
to their workplaces, and the feeling of entitlement to its ownership.
This strong bond, combined with the ideological and at times paternalistic 
public discourse of social ownership, shaped the relationship between workers 
and their workplaces. As has emerged from our analysis, this ‘feeling of owner-
ship’ was only minimally constructed through the management of the workers 
as prescribed by the Yugoslav ideology; rather, it was triggered through (oc-
casionally conflicting) social relations inside the factory, as well as through the 
manifold welfare rights and services that the companies and the trade union 
provided (housing, holidays, health care).33 Also, the reinvestment of part of 
29  For a detailed analysis of exemplary shop floor conflicts Schult, Zwischen Stechuhr und 
Selbstverwaltung. 
30  Jovana, interview with Jurkat, Jugoremedija, Zrenjanin, 17 April 2015.
31  We see the affection of workers towards their workplace not as a specifically socialist 
phenomenon that shapes also the postsocialist space but as an integral part of Western cap-
italist workspaces like those discussed in Mao Mollona, Gifts of Labour. Steel Production 
and Technological Imagination in an Area of Urban Deprivation – Sheffield, UK, Critique of 
Anthropology 25, no. 2 (2005), 177-192, DOI: 10.1177/0308275X05052022.
32  Literally, ‘čuvali smo je’. Edis, interview with Calori, Energoinvest TDS, Sarajevo, 17 Febru-
ary 2016; for a discussion on economic care in postsocialism André Thiemann, State Relations, 
Local State and Social Security in Central Serbia, PhD dissertation, University of Halle 2015.
33  Rory Archer, Social Inequalities and the Study of Yugoslavia’s Dissolution, in: Florian Bie-
ber / Armina Galijas / Rory Archer, eds, Debating the End of Yugoslavia, Surrey 2014, 135-151. 
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the company’s revenue into the development of one’s factory, rather than being 
spent on individual salaries, shaped workers’ ‘feeling of ownership’. To sum 
up, workers grounded their sense of attachment towards their workplace in two 
crucial areas: interpersonal relations with colleagues and management, and the 
financial investment that closely tied them to their factories.34
The ‘Marković Reforms’.  
The First Privatisation Phase in 1990
After the death of Tito, the 1980s in Yugoslavia were rife with debates concern-
ing economic, political, and social transformations. The economic crisis that hit 
the country after the 1979 oil shock was so severe that it demanded a prompt 
reaction from the political leadership. Stabilisation programmes were followed 
by a rapid increase in inflation, which resulted in hyperinflation during the 
second half of the 1980s. Late in that decade a series of economic reforms by the 
government of Branko Mikulić (1986-1989) aimed to break through Yugoslavia’s 
economic impasse by progressively opening up the country to the mechanisms 
of a market economy, partly by drawing on the tradition of market socialism as 
it had been developed in Yugoslavia since the early 1960s.35 These reforms were 
amongst the first steps towards the transformation of social ownership and the 
self-management system in the factories, and deepened the market economy in 
the country. The Enterprise Law (Zakon o Preduzećima) of 1988 marked the first 
transformation of the socialist Organisations of Associated Labour (Organizacije 
Udruženog Rada, OUR) into companies; the law introduced multiple forms of 
enterprises (complex enterprises, enterprises with private, public, or mixed 
ownership, etc.), and further regulated how they would be managed.36 
However, Mikulić’s reform programme failed to obtain full support from the 
federal leadership, which already bore the signs of internal division amongst the 
representatives of the various republics; moreover, social unrest peaked under 
his government.37 After Mikulić’s resignation in January 1989, Ante Marković 
became the new prime minister of federal Yugoslavia, thanks to his programme 
of economic reforms that introduced a new concept of internal privatisation 
through workers’ shareholding.38 This privatisation model was expected to 
34  We are aware of similarities with large enterprises in Western European economies in 
the 1960s and 1970s that had a similarly strong labour force; while it would be interesting to 
follow up on this, such a comparison is beyond the scope of this article.
35  Vladimir Unkovski-Korica, The Economic Struggle for Power in Tito’s Yugoslavia. From 
World War II to Non-Alignment, London 2016, 230
36  Službeni List SFRJ 44, no. 77 (1988), 1942-1956.
37  Nebojša Vladisavljević, Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution. Milošević, the Fall of 
Communism and Nationalist Mobilization, New York 2008, 111.
38  Raif Dizdarević, From the Death of Tito to the Death of Yugoslavia, Sarajevo 2009, 179.
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partly displace social ownership and acknowledge the value of workers’ capital 
as had been accumulated through prior labour, which gave them the right to 
own or purchase shares. Furthermore, it was meant to recognise workers and 
other internal shareholders as ‘the owners of social property’.39 As additionally 
argued by economic experts advising his government: ‘employee shareholding 
seems one of the most pragmatic solutions for the transformation of the social 
sector, since it is very close to our lengthy tradition of self-management.’40 It was 
thus made more acceptable for workers, who had internalised the concept of 
social ownership and were looking to utilise their attachment to it in pragmatic 
ways. Many of them had already recognised that workers’ management was 
cosmetic in nature; it was only natural, then, to leave managerial and execu-
tive tasks to a trusted managerial body and exercise one’s shareholding rights 
(participating in the shareholders assembly, deciding investments, and benefit-
ting from revenues).41 Reformists found in ‘ownership pluralisation’, i. e. in the 
redistribution of ownership rights amongst workers and a few private entities, 
a potential solution to companies’ inefficiency.
Internal shareholding, as implemented in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, 
was presented to workers as the first step of a transformation from social to 
private property. It would lead, management argued, to more efficient decision-
making and offered an exit out of the economic crisis. Workers at Jugoremedija 
and Energoinvest mostly welcomed it, as it would have monetised social own-
ership as shares and thus implied beneficial revenue. Throughout Yugoslavia, 
workers’ understanding of property transformation rapidly changed. While 
in 1990 workers still tended to prefer social ownership, by 1992 around 30% 
of them favoured the model of employee-owned property and 20% favoured 
the sale of social ownership.42 In some large companies the economic reforms 
of the late 1980s, entailing a wage freeze in 1988 and a significant reduction in 
workforce numbers, were met with hostility from the workers.43 In others—
generally those more profitable and market-oriented—reforms were welcomed. 
Jugoremedija and Energoinvest, following a similar trajectory to that of the latter 
group, remained comparatively successful even during the economic crisis; 
their workers supported internal shareholding. 
39  Bogomir Kovač, Program prestrukturiranja jugoslovenske privrede izmedju iluzija i 
realnosti, in: Nebojša Savić, ed, Prestrukturiranje, razvojni ciklus i privatizacija, Brijuni / Bel-
grade 1990, 42-51, 47.
40  Daniel Cvjetičanin / Diana Dragutinović / Nina Petrović, O tržištu kapitala u Jugoslaviji, 
in: Savić, ed, Prestrukturiranje, Razvojni Ciklus i Privatizacija, 180-187.
41  Kovač, Program prestrukturiranja jugoslovenske privrede, 43.
42  Slobodan Vuković, Čemu privatizacije?, Belgrade 1996, 141.
43  Ernst Lohoff, Der Dritte Weg in den Bürgerkrieg. Jugoslawien und das Ende der nach-
holenden Modernisierung, Bonn 1996, 116. 
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The Law on Property Transformation in Bosnia and Serbia 
With the first law on privatisation, the ‘Law on Social Capital’ (Zakon o Pro-
metu i Raspolaganju Društvenim Kapitalom) implemented in 1989, social property 
could be transformed into private, group, or mixed property.44 Speaking before 
the Federal Chamber, Ante Marković proposed that ‘workers may decide to 
put up social capital for sale, and it can be purchased by all domestic, foreign, 
legal, and physical persons’.45 Workers and the management could buy shares 
in their factories and thus become co-owners.
However, after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the laws of property trans-
formation differed in the successor states and were implemented at different 
moments. In Bosnia, the Marković laws were enforced between 1989 and 1991. 
In this period, Energoinvest underwent a property transformation that turned 
the company into an entity based on internal shareholding. Yet workers col-
lectively could purchase only 49% of the company’s overall capital. The reason, 
according to the company: 
‘Selling the majority of capital to workers will appear as a quasi-self-management 
and […] foreign investors […] would not want to either invest or buy part of 
a company in which the majority of the ownership is in the hands of the workers. 
[…] We think that capital intensive companies in Energoinvest are a less risky place 
for investment.’46
At this moment, the percentage of internally privatised capital in each factory or 
company within Energoinvest varied greatly. The law, in fact, allowed workers 
to buy shares and pay for them later, as long as they did so within ten years of 
the beginning of the process. Factories like Energoinvest Automatika in Sarajevo 
saw their workers buying roughly 40% of these shares, while in other factories 
the percentage of privatised shares was between 2% and 5%.47 However, one 
should not conclude that workers lacked interest in internal privatisation because 
of the relatively small percentage of shares that they purchased.48 Rather, the 
reason for the small percentage is that the process did not have the time to unfold 
properly: it was prematurely halted by the outbreak of the civil war in 1992.
In Serbia, the laws on privatisation underwent several changes during the 
1990s. Jugoremedija was one of the rare examples in Serbia of a company that 
44  Službeni List SFRJ, no. 84 (1989), 2043.
45  Consensus for Market Economy, Legal State and Democratic Society, statement by Ante 
Markovic at the SFRJ Assembly, in: Federal Executive Council Secretariat for Information, ed, 
Yugoslav Changes. Addresses and Statements by Ante Markovic, Yugoslav Prime Minister, 
Belgrade 1990, 107.
46  Energoinvest Statute 1990, Informativni Glasnik Energoinvest s.p. 3, 27 December 1990, 5-6. 
47  Privatizacija privatiziranog preduzeća?, DANI, 15 December 2006, 16.
48  Milica Uvalić, Investment and Property Rights in Yugoslavia. The Long Transition to 
a Market Economy, Cambridge 1992, 185.
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implemented nearly every model of privatisation.49 The pharmaceutical factory 
started its property transformation in 1993, as decided by the workers’ assembly. 
Due to hyperinflation, this process was halted and the value of the company 
was re-evaluated in 1994, following an amendment of the 1991 law. Through 
2001, shortly before a new law was implemented, the company was almost 
completely socially owned. Just 0.31% of its overall capital was in the hands of 
shareholders. Then, in January 2001, Jugoremedija underwent privatisation under 
the 1997 Law of Ownership Transformation (Zakon o svojinskoj transformaciji). 
This allowed current workers, pensioners and former workers to obtain shares 
free of charge, depending on how long they had worked in the factory; public 
employees or other ‘outsiders’ were also able to become small shareholders. In 
the end, around 28% of Jugoremedija’s overall value was owned by workers and 
pensioners, with an additional 30% in the hands of external small shareholders; 
the rest of the social property was nationalised. Some eighteen months later, 
under the new privatisation law of 2001, Jugoremedija continued its privatisation. 
Through auction, the state-owned shares (42% of the company’s value) were 
sold to the Macedonian company Jaka 80.50 
Workers’ Understanding of the First Property Transformation
In their narratives, workers from Energoinvest and Jugoremedija often remark 
how they had grown disillusioned with the model of self-management. From 
their perspective, a privatisation that granted them shareholding rights seemed 
to be in their favour. For example, workers at Energoinvest had felt widespread 
disappointment towards the self-management mechanisms, which caused 
them to question the existing system and to favour the model of property 
transformation introduced in the Marković era. Edin, a white-collar worker 
from Energoinvest TDS, observed:
‘I think that [self-management] was more an illusion than reality. The decisions were 
always taken somewhere else, and the plans prepared elsewhere. And now this 
[Marković] privatisation was the exit from that illusion. Because then you would 
have your share in all that, and that is the feeling of ownership.’51 
For blue-collar workers, the first property transition—closely connected to 
the dissolution of the workers’ council and thus with the restriction of their 
49  Branko Radulović / Stefan Dragutinović, Studija slučaja. Privatizacija u Srbiji, Belgrade 
2014, 143, https://www.slideshare.net/NALED/studija-sluaja-pet-uspenih-i-pet-neuspenih-
privatizacija-u-srbiji.
50  Milica Uvalic, Privatisation and Corporate Governance in Serbia (FR Yugoslavia), 
Florence 2001.
51  Edin, interview with Calori, Energoinvest TDS, Sarajevo, 17 February 2016.
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self-management rights—was predominantly welcomed. Zoran Rakić, the last 
president of Jugoremedija’s workers’ council, said: 
‘It is a fact that the abolishment of the workers’ council was accepted by everybody. 
Everybody voted because it was too much and nearly nobody was against it. Eve-
rybody could not wait for this to happen.’52 
In both cases, the dissatisfaction towards self-management merged with the 
beneficial prospect of becoming co-owners of a company or factory, cherished 
by workers as the source of their income and status. 
Moreover, as noted, a common policy in self-managed companies was to 
re-invest part of their annual surplus in the development of the factory rather 
than to use it to increase workers’ individual salaries or give them bonuses. 
The term ‘profit’, however, was controversial and, considered to be too close in 
its connotations with capitalism, was avoided. This terminological choice was 
important—as interviewees often remarked—because it constituted another 
fundamental basis for a ‘feeling of ownership’ towards their company, which 
led them to appropriate and accept the ideology of the Marković government’s 
‘gradual’ privatisation. Workers had expressed the desire to become sharehold-
ers in accordance with the Marković laws because of their previous investment 
in their own factories. Asim, a factory worker for Energoinvest TDS—one of 
the most profitable factories specialising in electric pylons and transformers—
explained his support for the shareholding transformation proposed by the 
Marković government as follows:
‘That [the Marković privatisation] was ok, because it was a contribution for the 
workers. Because these factories were made by us, I have made this factory person-
ally, it was built while I was working here. We allocated a part of our salaries for 
the construction of these factories, for their development. And so it was normal that 
I should have some participation in it, and that is why I bought those shares. We 
wanted to be co-owners. Those shares were mine, so if the factory decided to sell 
them I would be a shareholder and I would get a percentage of that.’53
In this context, allocating part of one’s salary towards factory shareholding was 
a crucial element of the first privatisation reforms, creating consensus amongst 
workers and fostering a ‘feeling of ownership’ towards their workplace.
In the case of Energoinvest, workers were allowed to purchase shares in their 
own factory, enabling the connection between a feeling of attachment to one’s 
workplace and personal financial benefit. Relevant here is the socio-economic 
situation of the time, marked by a significant economic crisis and a drop in living 
standards. As Dževad, an engineer in a profitable Energoinvest factory, remarked:
52  This is a quote from the documentary film ‘Radničko Samoupravljanje. Jedno Iskust-
vo’, directed by the association Ravnopravnost Zrenjanin 2011, in which Zoran Rakić was 
interviewed.
53  Asim, interview with Calori, Energoinvest TDS, Sarajevo, 6 April 2014.
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‘People thought that they will receive some benefits in a certain way, that they 
will be owners, and that they would be richer. It was not really important whether 
a director or the state would be in a management position; they rather thought that 
through their ownership they would be a bit richer.’54
Some of Jugoremedija’s workers, too, expected some financial gain from the sale 
and acquisition of shares:
‘They thought that a new time is coming and that democracy is coming which would 
ensure that everybody got shares and be owners and get their cash dividends.’55 
At the same time, workers for Jugoremedija noted that what made them assent 
to the property reforms of 1993 and 2001 was trust in the company’s manage-
ment and in their expertise.56 Workers acknowledged that they had not been 
fully aware of the implications of the privatisation reforms in the 1990s. Ivan, 
a representative of the trade union, noted that the workers’ union had explained 
what the property transition meant, but the reality was hard to clarify: 
‘It was hard for people to pass from one system to another. People understood 
this factory as theirs. Through this privatisation law they got some percentage of 
the shares and they were happy. But it was hard to explain what the privatisation 
meant.’57 
In the case of Jugoremedija, some workers stressed that this lack of awareness 
was a consequence of the hardships they had experienced during the 1990s.58 
Others welcomed the property transformation, since it would entitle them to 
receive a proportion of the company’s profits. Like their colleagues in Bosnia, 
they also understood the reforms of the 1990s to be a consolidation of their 
ownership rights.
The implementation of the first major property reforms in Bosnia in the early 
1990s and in Serbia throughout the 1990s inclined workers to see in them an op-
portunity to make the ‘feeling of ownership’ they had developed towards their 
workplaces seem more tangible. This sense of opportunity was also due to the 
comparatively strong performance in the global market by both companies in 
Serbia and in Bosnia, even during the early 1990s. Thus workers saw additional 
profit to be made through shareholding. The mounting dissatisfaction with the 
mechanisms of self-management, the consolidated trust in the general manage-
ment as a whole, and the prospects of financial reward were all factors which, 
54  Dževad, interview with Calori, Energoinvest d.d, Sarajevo, 16 December 2016.
55  Goran, interview with Jurkat, Jugoremedija, Zrenjanin, 15 April 2015. Cf. Jurkat, Erosion 
of Self-Management, 113.
56  Ivan Tchalakov / Nikula Jouko, Innovations and Entrepreneurs in Socialist and Post-So-
cialist Societies, Cambridge 2013; Nina Vodopivec, Social Memory of Textile Workers in 
Slovenia, Slovene Studies 30, no. 1 (2008), 63-78, 71.
57  Ivan, interview with Jurkat, Jugoremedija, Zrenjanin, 8 September 2016.
58  Jurkat, Erosion of Self-Management, 114.
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combined, fostered workers’ support for privatisation reforms. These aspects 
informed the reforms legally through the mechanism of internal shareholding, 
paralleled by a partial decrease of workers’ management rights. These changes 
were hardly seen as some ‘step backwards in Yugoslavia’, ‘sugarcoating the 
pill’ of the workers’ loss of management rights—as critics of late socialist mar-
ket reforms have argued.59 Rather, workers saw in them the opportunity for 
monetising their rights to social property by becoming collective shareholders. 
Regime Changes. Ownership Expectations  
within Capitalist Reconstruction
The respective paths of Energoinvest and Jugoremedija began to split after the 
first privatisation reforms of the early 1990s. These two factories were embed-
ded in progressively more divergent social and economic contexts, and thus 
will be accounted for separately in the following sections. 
In Bosnia, the war of 1992-1995, the re-nationalisation of companies in 1994, 
and the subsequent cancellation of privatised company shares together played 
a crucial role in workers’ understanding of the postsocialist transformation. 
Afterwards, the set of privatisation reforms implemented between 1997 and 
2002 resulted in the progressive collapse of Energoinvest and in its workers’ 
marginalisation. 
In Serbia, it was just after the regime change in October 2000, and after the 
implementation of a more liberal privatisation reform, that workers’ percep-
tion of ownership changed. In the case of Jugoremedija, the fear that one would 
lose company shares and indeed one’s very workplace changed the ‘feeling of 
ownership’ tremendously, leading workers to fight for their shareholding rights. 
In the following sections we explore the reasons why such concepts related to 
workers’ shareholding still linger in workers’ current narratives. As we illustrate, 
the late 1990s and early 2000s constitute a moment of rupture in the workers’ 
narratives of ‘transition’ since, for different reasons, they had been in favour of 
the reforms of the 1990s. Conversely, when the consequences of privatisation 
threatened their ownership rights, workers resorted to recalling their previous 
experiences of privatisation to make sense of these new transformations and 
to react to them.
59  For example, Catherine Samary, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia. An Overview, 
Amsterdam 1993, 27.
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Energoinvest. The Legacy of the Marković Reforms  
in Bosnia’s Postwar Setting
For Energoinvest, the first privatisation reforms were halted after the outbreak 
of war in 1992. However, in November 1994, with the conflict ongoing, a full 
nationalisation of all ‘social property’ in Bosnia was announced. This meant a de 
facto transfer of most of Bosnia’s companies to the state and its direct control.60 
With this first transformation we find workers’ ‘feeling of ownership’ towards 
their own factories began to change under the pressures of a new historical 
contingency. In fact, many of those who had expressed interest in acquiring or 
who had purchased their factory shares during the Marković reforms discov-
ered only upon return from the war’s frontlines that their factories had been 
nationalised and, in many cases, that the records of previously purchased shares 
were lost. This relatively sudden and unexpected development created much 
animosity and a widespread sense of betrayal amongst workers, who felt de-
ceived by the very state they had been called upon to defend. As bitterly stated 
by Azem, a blue-collar worker in Energoinvest TDS and a veteran of the Army of 
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine): 
‘We all had those shares [from the Marković time], but they simply disappeared, 
they were moved from social to state ownership, they were all nationalised. While 
we were working, fighting, they have transferred it into state ownership, and then 
they were able to sell the factories.’61 
Privatisation resumed in 1998, though under very different circumstances. A new 
model of rapid mass privatisation was implemented through the distribution 
of certificates or vouchers to the wider population, corresponding to a set per-
centage of overall state capital. A common policy across the postsocialist states 
of the eastern bloc, voucher privatisation had often resulted in controversial 
capital transfers from private citizens to investment funds.62 However, in the 
case of Bosnia, the same property that was now up for privatisation, as work-
ers later came to know, would not be assigned specifically to them as former 
employees. An individual could claim rights to it as a citizen and, additionally, 
as a veteran. Since the Bosnian state had little available liquidity, it opted to pay 
soldiers’ salaries in vouchers. While it had been common in Yugoslavia to grant 
special privileges to former partisans, social property was not directly one such 
privilege. In postwar Bosnia, the distribution of property rights was conducted 
60  Službeni List RBiH, no. 33, (1994), 470.
61  Azem, interview with Calori, Energoinvest TDS, Sarajevo, 6 April 2016.
62  Joseph E. Stiglitz, Quis custodiet ipsos custodies? Corporate Governances Failures in the 
Transition, Keynote at the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics – Europe. 
Governance, Equity and Global Markets, Paris, 21-23 June 1999, 11.
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at the entity level (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Republika Srpska) 
and responded to specific national ideologies.63 
Subsequently, workers’ entitlement to former ‘social property’ depended 
on their participation in the war; even then, it was not strictly linked to their 
specific workplace but only corresponded to a share of overall state capital.64 
Many small shareholders did not really understand that the value of certificates 
did not directly correspond to shares in their own companies. Concern mounted 
that certificates would quickly be devalued, as many sold them on the black 
market.65 This practice occurred across Bosnia, as the impoverished popula-
tion had no means other than selling vouchers to provide for their basic needs. 
In many cases, war profiteers bought vouchers and certificates from the most 
vulnerable and used them to buy state-owned property and assets for a very 
small fee.66 Thus the certificates’ value substantially decreased: apparently more 
than 99% of them were traded at 3% of their nominal value. At the end of 1999, 
the majority of certificates in the Federation had been used to purchase flats, 
with the rest being sold on the black market.67 Given the great sociopolitical and 
economic instability, certificates not only lost value very quickly due to dubious 
selling mechanisms but were also stripped of the meaning they had once had 
for workers. As Edin, a white-collar Energoinvest worker, remarked: ‘You know, 
one thing is if you pay for something in your own factory, you paid for it, so 
you take care for it more… but if you get something for free [like certificates] 
… well then you do not care that much, it is different.’68
Because of the situation, workers and their representatives began to feel re-
sentment, precisely because they had expected that they would be compensated 
following a model of internal shareholding à la Marković, i. e. with certificates 
that would guarantee them shareholding rights in their own company. Although 
in theory the new privatisation laws were supposed to guarantee the recogni-
63  Heike Karge, Transnational Knowledge into Yugoslav Practices? The Legacy of the 
Second World War on Social Welfare Policy in Yugoslavia, Comparativ. Zeitschrift für Globalge-
schichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 20, no. 5 (2010), special issue Katrin Boeckh / Na-
tali Stegmann, eds, Veterans and War Victims in Eastern Europe during the 20th Century. 
A Comparison, 75-86.
64  Xavier Bougarel, The Shadow of Heroes. Former Combatants in Post-War Bosnia-Her-
zegovina, International Social Science Journal 58, no. 189 (2006), 479-490.
65  Lejla Sarić, Od ukupne vrijednosti podijeljenih certifikata iskorišteno 1 posto, Generalni 
Servis Onasa, 6 December 1999. 
66  Timothy Donais, The Political Economy of Peacebuilding in Post-Dayton Bosnia, Abing-
don, New York 2005, 9.
67  Kate Bayliss, Post-Conflict Privatisation. A Review of Development in Serbia and Bos-
nia-Herzegovina, Overseas Development Institute, ESAU Working Paper 12, London, Au-
gust 2005, 43-44, https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opin-
ion-files/2519.pdf.
68  Edin, interview with Calori, Energoinvest TDS, Sarajevo, 17 February 2016.
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tion of shares purchased between 1990 and 1991 (under the Marković model), 
it became evident that the representatives of the new management actually had 
little interest in recognising workers’ shareholding. The impossibility of recuper-
ating the shares bought in 1990-1991, in addition to workers’ feelings of betrayal 
in the wake of the full nationalisation of their companies, contributed to a loss 
of trust in the new privatisation reforms. In turn, although postwar economic 
reforms in Bosnia envisaged a form of voucher distribution amongst veterans 
and citizens, these reforms did not foresee their involvement as shareholders.
Another consequence of nationalisation was the direct nomination of new 
management by the Ministry of Industry. Workers for Energoinvest felt that the 
government-appointed management had less expertise and as a whole lacked 
interest in the company’s growth or reconstruction after the conflict. Muarem, 
a blue-collar worker at Energoinvest’s Livnica in Tuzla, explained:
‘Since this new privatisation started, we felt unequal. Someone new comes to power 
[in the factory] and sends you to a disciplinary commission only because you are 
defending workers’ rights. And the criteria for which new directors are appointed 
is which party they belong to, not whether they will start production.’69
Although three and a half years of conflict had irreversibly changed companies, 
workplaces, and the socio-economic landscape overall, workers did not forget 
that a property transformation had been initiated before the war. The Marković 
privatisation model of internal employee buyouts had been particularly appeal-
ing to workers in late socialist workplaces, as they welcomed a ‘transition’ to 
a capitalist market economy that would guarantee them a financial benefit. Thus, 
upon consultation with their members, unions started proposing a privatisa-
tion model that very much echoed what had been initiated in early 1990 and 
1991. In one of his first postwar speeches in 1997, the president of the Bosnian 
Council of Independent Unions (Savez Samostalnih Sindikata Bosne i Hercegovine), 
Sulejman Hrle, remarked:
‘Workers are not against privatisation in principle, but they fear that war profiteers, 
local powers and directors will profit from illegal privatisation. […] We have pro-
posed a model of privatisation according to which workers would become co-owners 
of the majority of the capital as shareholders, the workers’ model of privatisation.’70
Hence, the union repeatedly remarked that workers and especially demobilised 
soldiers were ‘exceptionally interested in the privatisation of companies […] 
69  Muamer, interview with Calori, Livnica Celika, Tuzla, 9 May 2016.
70  Sulejman Hrle’s speech at an assembly of the Council of the Independent Unions, 29 
September 1997, 4. State Archive of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Documents Collection of the 
Council of Independent Unions (Vijeće Saveza Samostalnih Sindikata), Internal Publication 
no. 1, 1997-1998.
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which they have built as workers during their whole working life’.71 The way that 
workers and their unions advocated for a privatisation of companies through 
shareholding denotes that workers believed in a sort of collective privatisation, 
which would favour them as the main company stakeholders. In this way, work-
ers supported a form of privatisation which would mostly appeal to their ‘belief’ 
or ‘moral’ system, one in which workers would maintain a prominent role in 
society through control over their companies. This was a generation of workers 
who had come to criticise socialist self-management, and yet their value system 
was imbued with ideas of social justice. Workers grounded many of their hopes 
and assumptions about ‘transition’ on the combination of their belief in social 
justice—through workers’ participation—and expectations drawn from ‘market 
modernisation’. Though the war constituted a significant chasm between two 
distinct systems, the legacy of the Marković reforms was still present in workers’ 
understanding of workplace and property transformations. However, although 
workers had tried to respond to the situation through numerous strikes, they 
felt disempowered by a society increasingly dominated by a nationalist party 
logic. Reflecting on what was happening, a member of the Council of Independ-
ent Unions described this transformation as a misinformation-laden deception 
that was hurting workers:
‘This kind of privatisation through shares was presented to us and at a first glance 
we identified it as the Marković privatisation. […] That was what we had kept 
from Tito’s system of self-management, that workers can buy their companies and 
become owners. However, when the war finished and they told us that we once 
again would get the shares and be owners, it turned out that even my mother-in-
law, who never worked anywhere, could become the owner of the firm, because 
they gave her certificates!’72
Thus workers had maintained ownership expectations over companies that 
they still perceived as theirs, even though most of the (former) social property, 
including flats, machinery, and factories, had been nationalised. These expecta-
tions endured because they still felt the legacy of the Marković reforms—and, 
in part, the legacy of Tito’s Yugoslavia as well. The postwar reform project 
seeking the rapid privatisation of formerly socially owned companies clashed 
with workers’ expectations of shareholding and with their attachment to the 
legacy of late-socialist reforms. However, the new privatisation framework did 
not succeed in creating cohesive support for economic reforms amongst the 
workforce, not only because workers feared redundancy and unemployment 
but because it did not address their support for another kind of privatisation—
through shareholding—which had more closely involved them.
71  Sulejman Hrle’s speech at a hearing of the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia-Her-
zegovina, 27 August 1996, ibid.
72  Bajro, interview with Calori, Council of Independent Unions, Sarajevo, 8 July 2016.
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Jugoremedija. A Fight for Ownership
Jugoremedija’s workers began to transform their ‘feeling of ownership’ due 
to the experience of privatisation and the fear of losing their jobs. After the fac-
tory was privatised under the new law in 2002, a fraction of the workers who 
were also shareholders in the company identified themselves as its co-owners. 
This ‘feeling of ownership’ was strongly connected to the fight against ‘corrupt’ 
privatisation and became a tool for the workers during their struggles; later it 
would be an active assertion in decision-making processes.
This feeling derived from the uncertainty brought on by the privatisation pro-
cess. The Slovenian company Lek was supposed to buy 42% of the state-owned 
shares of Jugoremedija, while 58% of the ownership would initially remain in 
the hands of former workers, present workers, and small external shareholders. 
Workers expected that the privatisation by Lek would not significantly change 
anything; shareholding at that time was just a minor question. Ina, a produc-
tion worker, recalled:
‘I did not know at that time anything about shareholding. I did not find it interest-
ing. Everything was fine for me and I expected that it would go on like this with 
the cooperation with Lek and its purchase. And I did not think about what would 
happen afterwards.’73
It thus came as a shock to the management and workers when a relatively un-
known company, Jaka 80 from Macedonia, ended up buying the state-owned 
shares at auction in September 2002. The workers suspected the new owner and 
general manager of Jaka 80, Jovica ‘Nini’ Stefanović, of being a war profiteer 
who enriched himself by smuggling tobacco and exploiting his close affiliations 
with various state officials. One week after the auction, the ‘old’ management 
of Jugoremedija called for the small shareholders to collectively sell their shares 
to a brokerage house. The price of the shares would be three times higher than 
the initial price. This proposal was later abandoned because convincing around 
4,400 shareholders to sell their shares was deemed unrealistic. Not all sharehold-
ers were situated in Zrenjanin; they were scattered across Serbia and the former 
Yugoslavia, making it difficult to organise such a buyout, and it seemed impos-
sible to collectively sell more than 50% of the company’s shares. Even though 
these first attempts to unite the community of small shareholders failed, some 
of the workers realised that they could play an active role in determining the 
fate of the factory and could confront the company’s new management: ‘Just 
then we understood that we are a part of it’, commented Dušica, a former shop 
floor worker.74
73  Ina, interview with Jurkat, Jugoremedija, Zrenjanin, 7 April 2015.
74  Dušica, interview with Jurkat, Jugoremedija, Zrenjanin, 26 February 2014.
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With the establishment of the new management, workers grew even more 
sceptical due to changing social relations at the firm. The new management’s 
‘hostile’ attitude, the changing mode of production, and the pressure on work-
ers’ rights made workers increasingly suspicious of company policies:
‘Nini was a bit excluding and he behaved in a hostile way in the beginning. Just 
through this he caused some kind of antipathy. That was the moment when we 
started to ask around and we understood quite fast what shares are, and then we 
elected our representatives.’75
Workers also reported that the new management favoured higher profits over 
the quality of the raw materials used in production. Quality standards, once 
pedantically enforced by the former general managers, now dropped, and this 
change affected the pride workers took in the things they produced. Ivan stated: 
‘First, the raw material that arrived was of low quality. […] In some raw material 
from India they found a dead pigeon. […] In former Yugoslavia, the products of 
Jugoremedija were high quality. It came as a shock that we are now producing at 
such low quality.’76
The first open conflict between workers and the new management occurred 
when the former were forced to terminate their memberships in the trade union 
of the Council of Trade Unions (Savez Sindikata Srbije), and the trade union itself 
came under pressure to change the collective agreement. In December 2003, 
the new owner was suspected of having illegally recapitalised the factory and 
increasing his portion of the company’s shares to 62%. Workers felt betrayed: by 
buying the factory and unlawfully increasing his percentage of the shares, the 
new owner seemed to be engaged in money laundering. An occupation of the 
factory followed, as well as lawsuits and demonstrations which lasted for over 
four years; more than 150 workers were laid off. It was the mistrust in the new 
management, the influence of local and international activists, and widespread 
confidence in the strike’s leader, Zdravko Deurić, which shaped the protests as 
a fight to reclaim the factory for the workers.77 Deurić, also the chairman of the 
shareholder community, emphasised that the protests and workplace actions 
were not solely for better working conditions but for the good of ‘their’ factory 
as a whole: ‘Here we talk about the struggle between owners of Jugoremedija, 
75  Uroš, interview with Jurkat, Jugoremedija, Zrenjanin, 15 April 2014.
76  Ivan, interview with Jurkat, Jugoremedija, Zrenjanin, 8 September 2016.
77  Goran Musić emphasizes how Nebojša Popov, a sociologist and former member of the 
‘Praxis Group’, and the Anti-Corruption Council exerted a great influence on the Jugoremedija 
workers’ perception of workers’ shareholding and formed their understanding of it. Even 
though this is true, workers had already expressed the belief that the factories were ‘theirs’ 
before Popov became involved in the protests. Also the contributing factors, the changing of 
working conditions and the process of alienation after the privatisation, are mostly neglected 
by Musić. Goran Musić, Serbia’s Working Class in Transition 1988-2013, Belgrade 2010, 49-69, 
http://arhiv.rosalux.rs/userfiles/files/Goran_Music_Working_Class_Serbia.pdf.
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but not about the conflict between owner and workers. And […] it is clear that 
we fight for our rights—as workers and as owners.’78 In addition, the fight for 
the factory was connected to the fear of losing jobs. Because the administration 
of the factory had already been moved to Niš, workers were afraid that the 
company would be entirely resettled. Talking about their protests, Uroš said: 
‘They [other workers in Zrenjanin] never really realised that we are not fight-
ing for our salary. […] I’m fighting for my job and for my right to live through 
the property of the factory and that it will survive.’79 Even though the protests 
mounted by Jugoremedija’s workers were part of a wider strike wave caused by 
the consequences of the postsocialist transformation and privatisation in the 
early 2000s, the fight for property was rather unique to Serbia.80 It was seen as 
the only possibility of rescuing the factory from the bankruptcy and unemploy-
ment that other factories in Serbia had experienced. 
According to a 2005 decision of the Higher Commercial Court in Belgrade, 
the privatisation contract with Jaka 80 was annulled, so that the 42% of the 
shares were nationalised again.81 A few months later, Stefanović’s recapitalisa-
tion, which had made him the majority owner, was also declared unlawful.82 
The ‘feeling of ownership’ was transformed into an understanding of a way of 
managing the factory—not as it had been experienced under Yugoslav work-
ers’ self-management, but rather as envisioned by the laws of the 1990s. As 
Zdravko Deurić stressed at the meeting of worker-shareholders: ‘We fought for 
Jugoremedija, where we are going to respect the rights of its owners. Together 
with the other owners we will decide about our fate and we will share the profit 
we are going to achieve.’83
At the first shareholders’ meeting, the people elected to the management 
board were mostly Jugoremedija workers. Also, the new general manager was 
a former Jugoremedija worker. For some shareholders (mostly pensioners and 
external, small shareholders), the financial aspect of the shares became even 
more relevant. Uroš remembered:
‘When we came back to Jugoremedija in 2007 as workers then I had the problem that 
shareholders were calling me and asking when we are going to sell the shares. […] 
They wanted to cash in their share, because they already promised their children 
to buy something for them and everybody was counting on that.’84
78  Nebojša Popov, ed, Radno mesto pod suncem. Radničke borbe u Srbiji, Belgrade 2011, 57.
79  Uroš, interview with Jurkat, Jugoremedija, Zrenjanin, 15 April 2014.
80  Nada Novaković, Štrajkovi u Srbiji od 2000. do 2005. godine, Sociološki pregled 39, no. 3 
(2005), 309-325, 315, https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5PfUtWAVbsKOW9GbnhUSGNFM2s/
view.
81  Viši Trgovinski Sud u Beogradu, no. H.P. 2609/04, 31 May 2005.
82  Trgovinski Sud u Zrenjaninu, no. P. 303/2006, 23 June 2006.
83  Popov, Radno mesto pod suncem, 110.
84  Uroš, interview with Jurkat, Jugoremedija, Zrenjanin, 15 April 2014.
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Certain ways of thinking about ownership, productivity, and incentives, which 
echoed the ideas cultivated in the late 1980s, re-emerged: having shares in a fac-
tory will make workers work even harder for its success. Hence, it was not only 
a matter of fighting for ones’ factory, managing it, or being in charge of one’s 
own fate; the opportunity to benefit financially from it was also connected to 
the ‘feeling of ownership’. 
Conclusion
From the analysis of property transition through workers’ narratives in the 
two case studies of Energoinvest and Jugoremedija, a strikingly positive attitude 
towards workers’ shareholding has emerged. Rather than the ideologically 
charged concept of workers’ self-management, it was mostly the shop floor 
relations of respect and trust, as well as workers’ financial investment in the 
factories’ development, that established binding affection towards the Yugo-
slav workplace. With the first property reforms in the early 1990s, the model of 
workers’ shareholding became particularly appealing to workers. Trusting the 
management in their decision, and facing prospects of financial benefit, work-
ers approved the first steps of privatisation. This transformation was perceived 
as a reward for their hard work and contribution to the factory’s success. The 
resilience of a ‘feeling of ownership’—as a construct deriving from workers’ 
understanding of the workplace as ‘their own’—has informed and influenced 
the way property reforms are viewed and accounted for. In this context, work-
ers’ shareholding has emerged in different moments as a viable and—from 
a contemporary perspective—a desirable outcome of property transformations. 
In the rather exceptional case of Jugoremedija, major changes in the social 
relations internal to their factory, and the threat of a corrupted privatisation, 
strengthened workers’ ‘feeling of ownership’. Here, workers’ shareholding, 
initially met with mixed feelings in the 1990s, became a tool to contest corrup-
tion after 2002. Conversely, in the case of Energoinvest, workers welcomed the 
transformations of the last socialist government with greater enthusiasm; the 
disruption brought by the war, and the subsequent irregularities in the privatisa-
tion reform, led workers to look at internal shareholding as a legacy of reform 
socialism, an alternative to the transformations implemented in the postwar 
setting whose benefits had been denied to them. 
In both cases, shareholding is understood as a means to resist a form of priva-
tisation that would exclude workers. Yet only in the case of Jugoremedija could 
shareholding be put into practice, with workers becoming majority sharehold-
ers in their own factory. By contrast, in the case of Energoinvest shareholding 
has become a point of contention with the state, as workers feel that they were 
illegally deprived of their rights during the war, and as a result have lost the 
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possibility of transforming their ‘feeling of ownership’ into something financially 
tangible, namely shares.
In conclusion, in this paper we have sought to elucidate workers’ feeling of 
ownership towards their workplaces, and to trace its permutations throughout 
the economic transitions during late socialist and postsocialist Yugoslavia. By 
understanding property relations as a complex interaction of legal, ideological, 
cultural, and social aspects, we have shown how workers relate to ownership 
as a defining feature of their working experience. Our analysis sheds light on 
the intricate correlation among major historical changes, economic policy re-
forms, and bottom-up reactions to such changes. As we have shown, workers’ 
testimonies are not merely characterised by a nostalgic take on the socialist past, 
but rather present narratives of reflection, disillusion, and resistance that shape 
the way they make sense of the very processes of change. Through an in-depth 
analysis of workers’ narratives of transformation, it has been possible to grasp 
the resilience of a construct—that of workers’ shareholding—that continues to 
shape the postsocialist, post-Yugoslav workplace.
Acknowledgements. The authors would like to thank Augusta Dimou, Sabine 
Rutar, and André Thiemann for their comments on earlier versions of this paper, 
as well as the two anonymous reviewers.
CORRESPONDING AUTHORS
Anna Calori University of Exeter, Department of History, College of Humanities, Amory Building, 
Rennes Drive, Exeter, EX4 4RJ, United Kingdom. E-mail: ac594@exeter.ac.uk 
Kathrin Jurkat Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Institut für Geschichtswissenschaften, Abt. Südost-
europäische Geschichte, Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin, Germany. E-mail: kathrin@jurkat.de
